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Encoding information in quantum systems can offer surprising advantages but at the same time
there are limitations that arise from the fact that measuring an observable may disturb the state of
the quantum system. In our work, we provide an in-depth analysis of a simple question: What hap-
pens when we perform two measurements sequentially on the same quantum system? This question
touches upon some fundamental properties of quantum mechanics, namely the uncertainty principle
and the complementarity of quantum measurements. Our results have interesting consequences, for
example they can provide a simple proof of the optimal quantum strategy in the famous Clauser-
Horne-Shimony-Holt game. Moreover, we show that the way information is encoded in quantum
systems can provide a different perspective in understanding other fundamental aspects of quan-
tum information, like non-locality and quantum cryptography. We prove some strong equivalences
between these notions and provide a number of applications in all areas.
Quantum information studies how information is en-
coded in quantum systems and how it can be observed
through measurements. On one hand, the exponential
number of amplitudes that describe the state of a quan-
tum system can be used in order to encode a vast amount
of classical information into the state of a quantum sys-
tem. Hence, we can use quantum information to resolve
many distributed tasks much more efficiently than with
classical information [1–3]. On the other hand, quantum
information does not always offer advantages, since ev-
ery time an observer measures a quantum system its state
may collapse and information may become irretrievable.
For example, Holevo’s theorem [4], asserts that one quan-
tum bit can be used to transmit only one bit of classical
information and no more.
The intricate interplay between encoding information
in quantum systems and measurement interference is at
the heart of some fundamental results in quantum infor-
mation, from Bell inequalities [5] to quantum key distri-
bution [6]. Our goal is to deepen our understanding of the
connections between quantum encodings, non-locality,
and quantum cryptography and provide new insight on
the power and limitations of quantum information, by
looking at it through these various lenses.
This paper links three seemingly unrelated concepts
in quantum information (encodings, non-local games,
and cryptographic primitives) via properties of sequen-
tial non-commuting measurements. The technical part
of this paper examines quantum encodings and bounds
the success of sequentially measuring an encoding of two
bits (or strings) to learn their XOR. We then show how
these bounds can be used to study not only encodings,
but non-local games and cryptographic tasks as well. The
conceptual part of this paper discusses how the applica-
tions we consider are all equivalent in some sense. When
viewing each as extracting information from a quantum
encoding, we are able to preserve the three notions: (1)
hiding the XOR in the encoding, (2) providing perfect
security in the cryptographic task, and (3) satisfying the
non-signaling principle in the non-local game.
In addition to providing philosophical insights towards
each of these quantum tasks, we combine the technical
and conceptual tools in this paper to give applications in
all areas.
QUANTUM ENCODINGS AND
COMPLEMENTARITY OF MEASUREMENTS
One of the fundamental postulates of quantum me-
chanics is Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle which shows
that it is impossible to perfectly ascertain the momentum
and position of a particle. More precisely, entropic uncer-
tainty relations provide explicit bounds on the entropy of
the outcome distributions of the different measurements.
For example, if we consider two measurements in the
computational and Hadamard bases, then no matter the
state of the quantum system, there is always some en-
tropy in at least one of the outcome distributions, hence
the measurement outcomes cannot be perfectly predicted
simultaneously.
Another important notion, which is more closely re-
lated to quantum encodings, is the complementarity
of quantum measurements. Complementarity analyzes
what happens to the outcome distributions of measure-
ments when performed sequentially on the same system.
We say that two measurements are perfectly complemen-
tary, if after having performed the first measurement, no
more information can be extracted by performing the sec-
ond measurement on the post-measured state. This is,
for example, the case with a Hadamard and a compu-
tational basis measurement, or any measurement after a
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2complete projective measurement. On the other hand,
they are non-complementary if after measuring with one,
the outcome distribution of the second is unaffected.
We make the connection of complementarity and quan-
tum encodings clearer by considering the following sce-
nario: Let us consider two different observables that take
binary values x0 ∈ {0, 1} and x1 ∈ {0, 1} according to
some known distribution. Assume that given one copy
of a quantum system (of any dimension) in state ρx0,x1 ,
i.e., a quantum encoding of the bits x0, x1, there exists a
quantum measurement, i.e., a decoding procedure, that
correctly measures x0 with probability p0 and a different
measurement that correctly measures x1 with probability
p1. We would like to analyze these probabilities and more
specifically the average decoding probability (p0 + p1)/2.
Uncertainty relations show that when the measure-
ments are “incompatible” the average decoding proba-
bility cannot be too large. For example, for the compu-
tational and Hadamard bases one can show this prob-
ability is always at most cos2(pi/8). There are many
cases where we do not know the different measurement
operators, only the probabilities they succeed. For ex-
ample, one may not know the measurements used in an
implicit strategy in a cryptographic protocol or quantum
non-local game where the only defining property of the
strategy is the success probability. Could we still provide
some interesting bound on the average decoding proba-
bility that would hold independent of the measurement
operators, possibly by relating it to some other property
of the quantum encoding?
We provide such bounds by relating the average decod-
ing probability to the decoding probability of some other
function f(x0, x1) of the bits. Classically, it is straight-
forward to relate the probability of decoding f(x0, x1) to
the probabilities of decoding each bit xi; in the quantum
world, this task is delicate. Suppose we want to compute
the XOR of the two bits (i.e., compute whether the two
bits have the same value or not), and for this we perform
the measurement for each bit xi in sequence. Once the
first bit is decoded, the post-measured state is an eigen-
state of the first operator, hence the probability of then
correctly decoding the second bit may have changed.
Much of the previous literature about measuring the
post-measured state concerns ideas surrounding Heisen-
burg’s uncertainty principle (see, for example, [7] and
the references therein). In a setting more related to this
paper, post-measurement information has been used for
state discrimination [8, 9]. This is useful for cryptography
in the bounded-storage model [10] and the noisy-storage
model [11, 12].
LEARNING RELATIONS
Our first contribution is an analysis of the process of
sequentially performing two measurements on the same
quantum state: Let |ψ〉 be a pure state and {C, 1 − C},
{D, 1 − D} be two projective measurements such that
cos2(α) := ‖C|ψ〉‖22 ≥ 12 and cos2(β) := ‖D|ψ〉‖22 ≥ 12 ,
where C and D correspond to correctly measuring.
Through geometric arguments, we bound the probability
that both measurements succeed (give the correct guess)
or both fail (give the incorrect guess) as:
cos2(α− β) ≥ ‖CD|ψ〉‖22 + ‖(1− C)(1−D)|ψ〉‖22
≥ cos2(α+ β). (1)
FIG. 1: (Color online) Simple scenario for the lower bound
in Equation (1): Two-outcome projective measurements on a
pure state in two dimensions. By successive measurements,
one can learn the XOR by learning both bits correctly or by
learning both bits incorrectly. This occurs with probability
cos2(α) cos2(α+ β) + sin2(α) cos2(α+ β) = cos2(α+ β).
In the language of quantum encodings, we can use (1)
to provide the following learning relation for bits, and
extend it to strings. (The proof of Equation (1) and
Theorem 1, below, can be found in the appendix.)
Theorem 1. For any quantum encoding of bits x0
and x1, Pr[learning x0 ⊕ x1] ≥ (2c − 1)2, where
we define c := 12 Pr[learning x0] +
1
2 Pr[learning x1].
For x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}n, if c ≥ 1/2, then we have
Pr[learning x0 ⊕ x1] ≥ Pr[learning (x0, x1)] ≥ c(2c− 1)2.
The probability of learning a bit (or a bit string) is the
maximum over all quantum measurements of correctly
measuring the bit (or bit string). Theorem 1 shows that,
independent of the measurements, the average probabil-
ity of correctly measuring two observables cannot be very
large unless at the same time the probability of correctly
measuring both or none of the observables is large as well.
A similar result has been obtained for a restricted class
of encodings, those based on hyperbits [13].
We can now define a measure of complementarity Γ,
as the difference between the probability of decoding the
XOR of the two bits and the probability had the mea-
surements been non-complementary. By Equation (1),
3|Γ| =
∣∣∣‖CD|ψ〉‖22 + ‖(1− C)(1−D)|ψ〉‖22
− ‖C|ψ〉‖22 ‖D|ψ〉‖22 − ‖(1− C)|ψ〉‖22 ‖(1−D)|ψ〉‖22
∣∣∣
≤ 1
2
sin(2β) sin(2α). (2)
Note Γ is zero for non-complementary measurements and
our bound can be saturated, e.g., when C = D we have
Γ = 12 sin(2β) sin(2α), and for C = 1 − D we have
Γ = − 12 sin(2β) sin(2α).
THE CLAUSER-HORNE-SHIMONY-HOLT GAME
AS A QUANTUM ENCODING
Non-locality is a fundamental property of quantum in-
formation. Here, two space-like separated parties, Alice
and Bob, initially share some resource and do not com-
municate further. We study the joint probability distri-
butions of measurement outcomes that can arise when
Alice and Bob perform measurements locally. Bell in-
equalities provide bounds on the possible distributions
when the initial resource is classical and we are inter-
ested in the maximum violation when Alice and Bob
share quantum entanglement.
One can describe Bell inequalities as games between
Alice and Bob. For example, in the Clauser-Horne-
Shimony-Holt (CHSH) game [14], Alice receives a ran-
dom x ∈ {0, 1} and outputs a ∈ {0, 1} and Bob receives a
random y ∈ {0, 1} and outputs b ∈ {0, 1}. The quantum
value of the game, ω∗(CHSH), is the maximum probabil-
ity that a⊕ b = yx over all initial states and all measure-
ment operators. There is a quantum strategy to win this
game with probability cos2(pi/8); moreover, Tsirelson’s
bound shows this value is optimal [15].
Recently, non-locality has been studied from the point
of view of information. The goal is to understand quan-
tum mechanics through information principles: for exam-
ple, why is there a quantum strategy for the CHSH game
with probability exactly cos2(pi/8) and not more? Infor-
mation causality, one such postulate about information
transmission, asserts that any theory that abides to it
must comply with Tsirelson’s bound for the CHSH game
[16]. To make the connection between non-locality and
quantum information more clear, let us see how we can
recast the CHSH game as a quantum encoding: Once Al-
ice receives x and measures a, Bob’s post-measurement
state can be seen as an encoding of a and x. When
y = 0, Bob needs to output a and when y = 1, he
needs to output a⊕ x. Hence, we can write the value as
ω∗(CHSH) =
1
2
(Pr[Bob learns a]+Pr[Bob learns a⊕x]).
Note that the non-signaling condition of CHSH implies
the probability of Bob guessing Alice’s input x is 1/2
or equivalently the probability of learning the XOR of
a and a ⊕ x is 1/2 (in this case, we say that the en-
coding “hides” the XOR). With this perspective, Theo-
rem 1 provides an alternative proof of Tsirelson’s bound,
since solving the inequality (2ω∗(CHSH)−1)2 ≤ 1/2 gives
ω∗(CHSH) ≤ cos2(pi/8).
LEARNING RELATIONS AND OBLIVIOUS
TRANSFER
Another area where quantum information has had
great impact is cryptography. The properties of quantum
information, for example, the uncertainty principle, en-
able secure key distribution protocols [6], however, when
the two parties do not trust each other, there are only
partial advantages. For example, quantum protocols for
coin flipping or bit commitment can only restrict cheating
to a probability of 1/
√
2 or 0.739, respectively [17–19].
We wish to relate the ability to perform cryptographic
primitives to non-locality and quantum encodings.
We look at oblivious transfer (OT), defined below.
Definition 1 (Imperfect oblivious transfer). A quantum
oblivious transfer protocol with correctness p, denoted
here as OTp, is an interactive protocol with no inputs,
between Alice and Bob such that:
• Alice outputs two independent, uniformly random
bits (z0, z1) or Abort and Bob outputs uniformly
random bit b and another bit w or Abort.
• If Alice and Bob are honest, w = zb with probability
p.
• Alice and Bob can abort only if cheating is detected.
• If p = 1 we say the protocol is perfect.
Ideally at the end of the protocol, Bob should only learn
the value of zb and Alice should remain oblivious to which
bit Bob learned [20, 21].
We also examine quantum oblivious string transfer
protocols with correctness p, denoted here as OTnp which
is defined analogously to an imperfect oblivious transfer
protocol except z0 and z1 are n-bit strings.
Oblivious transfer is the most important task in pro-
viding security between distrustful parties, since any
complex operation can be rendered secure using secure
oblivious transfer [22]. Using Theorem 1, we prove a se-
ries of new results for oblivious transfer [32]. First, we
extend the oblivious transfer bounds in [23] to oblivious
string transfer, and show that in any protocol, either Al-
ice can learn Bob’s index or Bob can learn both of Alice’s
strings with probability at least 58.52% (proof in the ap-
pendix). Second, we consider the case when cheating
Bob wants to learn the XOR of Alice’s bits. Note that
most definitions enforce that Bob gets no information
about Alice’s other bit (instead of the XOR of her bits).
Classically, the two definitions are equivalent [24]. Quan-
tumly, we use the XOR definition that relates directly to
the CHSH game (discussed in the next section).
4Theorem 2. For any OTp protocol, we have
p ≤ Pr[Alice learns b]
(√
Pr[Bob learns z0 ⊕ z1] + 1
)
.
Proof. We show how to use oblivious transfer to con-
struct a coin flipping protocol. A quantum coin flipping
protocol with correctness p, denoted CFp, is an inter-
active protocol with no inputs, between Alice and Bob
such that:
• The protocol is aborted with probability 1−p when
Alice and Bob are honest.
• If the protocol is not aborted, then they both
output a randomly generated bit c.
We say that the coin flipping protocol has cheating
probabilities ACF and BCF where
• ACF := maxc∈{0,1} Pr[Bob accepts outcome c],
• BCF := maxc∈{0,1} Pr[Alice accepts outcome c].
The coin flipping protocol is as follows.
1. Alice and Bob perform the OTp protocol so they
have outputs (z0, z1) and (b, w) respectively.
2. If no one aborted, then Alice sends randomly cho-
sen d ∈R {0, 1} to Bob.
3. Bob sends b and w to Alice.
4. If zb from Bob is inconsistent with Alice’s bits
then Alice aborts. Otherwise, they both output
c = b⊕ d.
We see that when Alice and Bob are honest, Alice
aborts in this protocol with probability 1 − p, since p
is the probability that Bob receives the correct bit in the
OTp protocol. If Alice does not abort, the outcome of
the coin flipping protocol is random.
Cheating Alice: Let AOT denote the probability Alice
can learn b in the OTp protocol (without Bob aborting)
and let ACF denote the probability Alice can force hon-
est Bob to accept a desired outcome in the coin flipping
protocol. It is straightforward to see that AOT = ACF.
Cheating Bob: Let BOT denote the probability Bob
can learn z0 ⊕ z1 in the OTp protocol (without Alice
aborting) and let BCF denote the probability Bob can
force honest Alice to accept a desired outcome in the
coin flipping protocol. Using our XOR learning relation
for bits, and an analysis similar to the one in [23], we can
show that
√
BOT + 1
2
≥ BCF. Kitaev’s lower bound for
coin flipping [17] states that
ACFBCF ≥ Pr[Alice and Bob honestly output 0]
for any quantum coin flipping protocol. In the case of
the coin flipping protocol above, we have that Alice and
Bob both output either bit with probability p/2 (since
the protocol is aborted with probability 1 − p). There-
fore, we have AOT
√
BOT + 1
2
≥ ACFBCF ≥ p
2
implying
AOT
(√
BOT + 1
) ≥ p, proving Theorem 2.
Notice that for secure protocols with
Pr[Alice learns b] = 12 and Pr[Bob learns z0 ⊕ z1] = 12 ,
we have p ≤ cos2(pi/8), which shows that the secure
oblivious transfer protocol in [25] is optimal. Last,
by relating oblivious transfer and bit commitment
protocols [23], we prove that in any OT protocol with
p = 1, Alice can learn Bob’s index or Bob can learn
the XOR of Alice’s bits with probability at least 59.9%
(proof in the appendix).
EQUIVALENCES BETWEEN CHSH-TYPE
GAMES, SECURE OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER AND
QUANTUM ENCODINGS
So far, we have used Theorem 1 to provide results
about the CHSH game and oblivious transfer. We now
show that these applications are deeply connected and
can be extended to more intricate non-local games and
oblivious transfer variants. Such non-local games are
important since knowing their Bell inequality violations
brings us that much closer to understanding the true
power of quantum entanglement and the hope of char-
acterizing it as a resource via the right information pos-
tulate(s).
We now consider secure OTnp protocols where Alice
can obtain no information about Bob’s index b (without
him aborting) and Bob can obtain no information about
z0 ⊕ z1 (without Alice aborting).
We also consider the following generalization of the
CHSH game.
Definition 2 (CHSHn game). The CHSHn game is a
game between Alice and Bob where:
• Alice and Bob are allowed to create and share an
entangled state |ψ〉 before the game starts. Once
the game starts, there is no further communication
between Alice and Bob.
• Alice receives a random string x ∈ {0, 1}n and Bob
receives a random bit y ∈ {0, 1}.
• Alice outputs a ∈ {0, 1}n and Bob outputs
b ∈ {0, 1}n.
• Alice and Bob win if ai ⊕ bi = y xi, for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The value of the game, ω∗(CHSHn), is the maximum
probability which Alice and Bob can win.
The CHSH game is the special case when n = 1 (we
omit the subscript 1 in this case).
A relationship between learning probabilities and
quantum games is pointed out in [26], where they show
5that in any physical theory, the amount of non-locality
and uncertainty of the theory are tightly linked. In our
equivalences, we strengthen the quantum connection by
conserving the notions of security / non-signaling / hid-
den XOR and we deal with the interactivity of oblivious
transfer protocols.
Theorem 3. The following four statements are equiva-
lent for every n ∈ N:
1. There is a quantum encoding of x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}n
that hides the XOR and 12
∑
c∈{0,1} Pr[learn xc] =
p.
2. There is a secure, non-interactive OTnp protocol.
3. There is a secure OTnp protocol.
4. There is a strategy for winning the game CHSHn
with probability p.
Proof. We provide four reductions.
(1. =⇒ 2.). Let {ρx0,x1 : x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}n} be a set of
quantum states and {pix0,x1 : x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}n} be a prob-
ability distribution satisfying the properties of statement
1 of Theorem 3. Alice chooses x0, x1 with probability
pix0,x1 and sends ρx0,x1 to Bob. Alice outputs
(z0, z1) := ((1 − a)x0 + ax1 + d1, (1 − a)x1 + ax0 + d2),
for random choices of a ∈ {0, 1} and d1, d2 ∈ {0, 1}n that
she sends to Bob. The first bit randomizes the success
probabilities for Bob (so he has an equal probability of
learning z0 and z1) and the d1, d2 bit strings ensure that
Alice’s outcomes are random. Bob picks a random bit
b and measures to learn zb depending on a, d1, d2. In
particular, the probability of learning zb for b ∈ {0, 1} is
equal to the average decoding probability of x0 and x1,
hence equal to p. Note that z0 ⊕ z1 = x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ d1 ⊕ d2
is hidden from Bob and Alice cannot learn b (since Bob
does not send any message), thus this protocol is secure.
(2. =⇒ 4.). Suppose there is a secure, non-interactive
OTnp protocol. Without loss of generality [33], Alice
and Bob’s joint state from the non-interactive OTnp
protocol is 1/2n
∑
z0,z1∈{0,1}n |z0, z1〉〈z0, z1| ⊗ ρz0,z1 ,
for some ρz0,z1 in Bob’s space B. Since Alice has no
information about b, Bob can use ρz0,z1 and measure-
ments {M0z0}z0∈{0,1}n , {M1z1}z1∈{0,1}n to learn the value
of Alice’s first and second string, respectively, with
Pr[Bob learns z0] = Pr[Bob learns z1] = p. Consider
some purification |ψz0,z1〉 ∈ A ⊗ B of ρz0,z1 where A is
controlled by Alice. Let
|Ω〉 := 1
2n
∑
z0,z1∈{0,1}n
|z0 ⊕ z1〉A1 |z0〉A2 |z1〉A3 |ψz0,z1〉AB,
|Ωx〉 to be the post-measured state assuming Alice
measured A1 to get x, and ρx := TrA2A3A|Ωx〉〈Ωx| to
be Bob’s state. We have ρx = ρ0, ∀x ∈ {0, 1}n, since
Bob has no information about z0 ⊕ z1. By Uhlmann’s
theorem, for all x ∈ {0, 1}n, there exists unitary Ux on
A2 ⊗A3 ⊗A with (Ux ⊗ IB)|Ω0〉 = |Ωx〉. We define the
CHSHn strategy:
1. Alice and Bob share the state |Ω0〉 and receive ran-
dom x ∈ {0, 1}n and y ∈ {0, 1}, respectively.
2. Alice applies (Ux) such that Alice and Bob share
the state |Ωx〉. She measures the space A2 in the
computational basis to get her outcome a.
3. Bob applies the measurement {Myb }b∈{0,1}n on his
space B to determine his outcome b.
Conditioned on Alice receiving x and outputting a,
Bob has the state TrA|ψa,x⊕a〉〈ψa,x⊕a| = ρa,x⊕a. If Bob
gets y = 0, he must output b = a. If Bob gets y = 1, he
must output b = a ⊕ x. The probability they win the
CHSHn game with this strategy is hence equal to p.
(3. =⇒ 1.). Let |Ω〉AB be the final joint state of the
OTnp protocol for honest Alice and Bob. Suppose Al-
ice measures to learn (z0, z1) which are distributed uni-
formly. Let ρz0,z1 be Bob’s post-measured state. Then,
{ρz0,z1 : z0, z1} and pi being the uniform distribution
satisfy the hidden XOR condition, since Alice does not
abort (both parties are honest), and the protocol is se-
cure. We now describe a procedure to decode each zc,
for c ∈ {0, 1}, with probability p.
We may assume Bob measures his part of the state
|Ω〉AB (instead of decoding ρz0,z1) since it does not
matter if Alice measures before or after Bob. Suppose
|Ωb〉AB is the post-measured joint state when Bob par-
tially measures |Ω〉AB to obtain his index b. Since Bob
will not abort and the protocol is secure, we know b is
hidden from Alice. Again, by Uhlmann’s theorem, Bob
can transform |Ω0〉 to |Ω1〉 and vice versa via a unitary
acting on B. Hence Bob can measure |Ω〉AB to learn b,
collapse the state to |Ωb〉 and then apply the unitary
mapping |Ωb〉 to |Ωc〉. He then uses the decoding pro-
cedure of the OTnp protocol to learn zc with probability p.
(4. =⇒ 1.). Let |Ω〉AB be the state that Alice and
Bob share before receiving x and y in a CHSHn game
strategy that succeeds with probability p. Suppose Alice
measures to learn a (conditioned on x). Let ρa,x be
Bob’s post-measured state which occurs with probability
pia,x. We define the necessary states and probabilities
by relabelling a → x0 and x ⊕ a → x1. Then, Bob has
no information about x0 ⊕ x1 = a ⊕ (x ⊕ a) = x from
non-signaling, and the average decoding probability for
x0 and x1 is p.
Since trivially (2. =⇒ 3.), we conclude the proof of
Theorem 3.
We can also prove an equivalence between quantum
encodings of n pairs of bits that hide the XOR of each
pair and the n-fold repetitions of CHSH and OT, defined
6below.
Definition 3 (n-fold repetition of oblivious transfer). A
quantum n-fold repetition of oblivious transfer protocol
with correctness p, denoted here as OT⊗np , with cheating
probabilities AOT⊗n and BOT⊗n , is defined analogously
to an imperfect oblivious string transfer protocol except b
is an n-bit string (so zb takes values from each of Alice’s
strings according to b). We say an OT⊗np protocol is se-
cure if Alice can gain no information about the string b
(without Bob aborting) and if Bob can gain no informa-
tion about the string z0 ⊕ z1 (without Alice aborting).
Definition 4 (n-fold repetition of CHSH). An n-fold
repetition of CHSH, denoted CHSH⊗n, is a game
between Alice and Bob where:
• Alice and Bob are allowed to create and share an
entangled state |ψ〉 before the game starts. Once
the game starts, there is no further communication
between Alice and Bob.
• Alice receives a random x ∈ {0, 1}n and Bob re-
ceives a random y ∈ {0, 1}n.
• Alice outputs a ∈ {0, 1}n and Bob outputs
b ∈ {0, 1}n.
• Alice and Bob win if ai ⊕ bi = xi · yi, for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The value of the game, ω∗(CHSH⊗n), is the maximum
probability which Alice and Bob can win.
Theorem 4. The following four statements are equiva-
lent for every n ∈ N:
1. There is an encoding of x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}n that hides
the XOR and 12n
∑
c∈{0,1}n Pr[learn xc] = p, where
xc ∈ {0, 1}n is defined as (xc)i := (xci)i.
2. There is a secure, non-interactive OT⊗np protocol.
3. There is a secure OT⊗np protocol.
4. There is a strategy for winning the game CHSH⊗n
with probability p.
APPLICATIONS OF EQUIVALENCES
Our equivalences provide new ways of looking at non-
local games and cryptographic primitives, through the
lens of quantum encodings. Apart from conceptual tools,
we can use the equivalences to prove a number of results
in all areas.
First, using Theorem 1 for encodings that hide the
XOR with n = 1 and Theorem 4, we have an al-
ternative proof of the optimality of Tsirelson’s bound,
ω∗(CHSH) ≤ cos2(pi/8).
Using Theorem 1 for encodings that hide the XOR and
Theorem 3, we provide a new upper bound on the value
of CHSHn, ω
∗(CHSHn) ≤ 12 + 1√2n+1 . It is an interesting
open question to compute the exact quantum value of
this game, especially since it is a simple generalization
of the CHSH game for which the quantum value is not
known to be implied by information causality.
There is an alternative way of upper bounding the
value of this game numerically using semidefinite pro-
gramming (SDP) [27]. We provide below the values for
small n. We see that the SDP relaxation gives a tighter
bound than ours for n ≤ 3, but the numerical results
suggest that our bound outperforms the SDP bound for
larger values of n.
Value n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5
Lower Bound 0.750 0.625 0.562 0.531 0.515
Conjectured Value 0.853 0.750 0.676 0.625 0.588
SDP Relaxation 0.853 0.780 0.743 0.725 0.716
Our Bound 1 0.853 0.750 0.676 0.625
The table above also includes our conjectured optimal
value, below.
Conjecture 1. ∀n ∈ N, ω∗(CHSHn) = 12 + 12
√
1
2n .
Similarly, for secure OTnp , we have p ≤ 12 + 1√2n+1
(again, for n = 1, we can get the optimal p ≤ cos2(pi/8)).
Second, by Theorem 4 and the perfect parallel repeti-
tion property of CHSH [28], i.e., the fact that if Alice and
Bob play n games in parallel, the probability of winning
all games is exactly (cos2(pi/8))n, we have for any secure
OT⊗np protocol, p ≤ (cos2(pi/8))n, which is attainable by
using n secure OTcos2(pi/8) protocols. In other words, se-
cure oblivious transfer admits perfect parallel repetition.
ROBUSTNESS OF EQUIVALENCES
Similar results can also be obtained in the case of a
weighted average decoding probability defined as
qPr[learning x0] + (1 − q) Pr[learning x1], for q ∈ [0, 1].
When the XOR is hidden, and q = 1/2, Theorem 1 shows
that the above quantity is at most cos2(pi/8). A similar
analysis shows that for any q, this value is at most
1
2
+
1
2
√
q2 + (1− q)2. (3)
It is also interesting to see that such a learning relation
is related to the CHSH game where Bob gets input y =
0 with probability q and input y = 1 with probability
1 − q while Alice still gets a uniform input. Using a
similar method than in Theorem 3, we can show that
this game has value at most 12 +
1
2
√
q2 + (1− q)2. We can
show the optimality of this bound using the semidefinite
programming characterization of the bias of XOR games
in [28].
7DISCUSSION
We have provided new relations between the average
decoding probability of two bits (or strings) and the prob-
ability of decoding their XOR. Moreover, we have shown
precise equivalences between quantum encodings, CHSH-
type games, and oblivious transfer, showing that non-
locality and cryptographic primitives are often two facets
of the same quantum mechanical behaviour. Last, we
used our equivalences to prove new results for non-local
games and oblivious transfer protocols.
As we have mentioned, it is an open question to com-
pute the quantum value of the game CHSHn through
semidefinite programming or by proving stronger
learning relations. Moreover, we would like to find
an information postulate that implies that any theory
that abides to it must win this game with exactly the
quantum value (similar to information causality for the
case of CHSH).
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Appendix
Proof of Equation (1) and Theorem 1
Recall Equation (1) reproduced below,
cos2(α− β) ≥ ‖CD|ψ〉‖22 + ‖(1− C)(1−D)|ψ〉‖22
≥ cos2(α+ β).
We first prove the lower bound. Define the following
states:
|X〉 := C|ψ〉‖C|ψ〉‖2
, |X ′〉 := (I − C)|ψ〉‖(I − C)|ψ〉‖2
,
|Y 〉 := D|ψ〉‖D|ψ〉‖2
, |Y ′〉 := (I −D)|ψ〉‖(I −D)|ψ〉‖2
.
We can write |ψ〉 as
|ψ〉 = cos(α)|X〉+ sin(α)|X ′〉 = cos(β)|Y 〉+ sin(β)|Y ′〉.
Since |X〉 is an eigenvector of C, we can write
C = |X〉〈X| + ΠC and similarly we can write
I − C = |X ′〉〈X ′|+ ΠC′ , such that
〈ΠC , |X〉〈X|〉 = 〈ΠC′ , |X〉〈X|〉
= 〈ΠC , |X ′〉〈X ′|〉
= 〈ΠC′ , |X ′〉〈X ′|〉
= 0.
8We now write |Y 〉 = γ0|X〉 + γ1|X ′〉 + γ2|Z〉, where
‖|Z〉‖2 = 1, 〈X|Z〉 = 〈X ′|Z〉 = 0, and |γ0| =
√
x0,
|γ1| = √x1, and |γ2| = √x2 for some x0, x1, x2 ∈ [0, 1].
Using this expression for |Y 〉, we have
‖CD|ψ〉‖22 = cos2(β) ‖C|Y 〉‖22
= cos2(β)
(
x0 + x2 ‖ΠC |Z〉‖22
)
.
Since |ψ〉=cos(α)|X〉+sin(α)|X ′〉=cos(β)|Y 〉+ sin(β)|Y ′〉,
we can write |Y ′〉 = γ′0|X〉 + γ′1|X ′〉 + γ′2|Z〉, with
|γ′0| =
√
x′0, |γ′1| =
√
x′1, and |γ′2| =
√
x′2 for some
x′0, x
′
1, x
′
2 ∈ [0, 1]. Using this expression for |Y ′〉, we have
‖(1− C)(1−D)|ψ〉‖22 = sin2(β) ‖(1− C)|Y ′〉‖22
= sin2(β)
(
x′1 + x
′
2 ‖ΠC′ |Z〉‖2
)
.
Notice that
1 = ‖C|Z〉‖22 + ‖(I − C)|Z〉‖22 = ‖ΠC |Z〉‖22 + ‖ΠC′ |Z〉‖22 .
We define A := ‖ΠC |Z〉‖22 = 1− ‖ΠC′ |Z〉‖22. This yields
‖CD|ψ〉‖22 + ‖(1− C)(1−D)|ψ〉‖22
= cos2(β)
(
x0 + x2 ‖ΠC |Z〉‖22
)
+ sin2(β)
(
x′1 + x
′
2 ‖ΠC′ |Z〉‖22
)
= cos2(β) (x0 + x2A) + sin
2(β) (x′1 + x
′
2(1−A))
= cos2(β)x0 + sin
2(β) (x′1 + x
′
2)
+A
(
cos2(β)x2 − sin2(β)x′2
)
= cos2(β)x0 + sin
2(β) (1− x′0)
+A
(
cos2(β)x2 − sin2(β)x′2
)
. (4)
Define A(ρ, σ) := arccosF (ρ, σ) to be the angle between
two states ρ and σ, which is a metric (see p. 413 in [31]).
Since 〈Y |Y ′〉 = 0, we have
A(|Y ′〉, |X〉) ≥ pi/2−A(|X〉, |Y 〉).
This implies that√
x′0 = cos (arccos |〈Y ′|X〉|)
≤ cos (pi/2− arccos√x0)
= sin (arccos
√
x0)
=
√
1− x0.
This yields x′0 ≤ 1−x0. In addition, notice that 〈ψ|Z〉 =
0, which implies that
〈Z| (cos(β)|Y 〉+ sin(β)|Y ′〉) = 0
⇐⇒ cos2(β)|〈Z|Y 〉|2 = sin2(β)|〈Z|Y ′〉|2
⇐⇒ cos2(β)x2 = sin2(β)x′2.
This gives us the bound,
‖CD|ψ〉‖22 + ‖(1− C)(1−D)|ψ〉‖22 ≥ x0. (5)
To conclude, we have
arccos(
√
x0) = A(|X〉, |Y 〉)
≤ A(|X〉, |ψ〉) +A(|ψ〉, |Y 〉)
≤ α+ β,
yielding x0 ≥ cos2(α + β) which concludes the proof of
the lower bound.
For the upper bound, we have x′0 ≤ 1 − x0 and
cos2(β)x2 = sin
2(β)x′2, hence,
‖CD|ψ〉‖22 + ‖(1− C)(1−D)|ψ〉‖22 ≤ 1− x′0,
from (4). We now show 1 − x′0 ≤ cos2(β − α). Since√
x′0 = |〈Y ′|X〉|, we have
arccos
(√
x′0
)
= A(|Y ′〉, |X〉)
≤ A(|X〉, |ψ〉) +A(|Y ′〉, |ψ〉)
= pi/2− (β − α).
so
√
x′0 ≥ cos(pi/2 − (β − α)) = sin(β − α) implying
1− x′0 ≤ cos2(β − α), as desired.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof of the first statement
in the theorem relies on the following decoding strategy:
First, we apply the decoding procedure for learning the
first bit and then we apply the second decoding proce-
dure on the post-measurement state. The probability of
decoding the XOR is the probability that both decoding
procedures succeed (give correct guesses for each bit) or
they both fail (give incorrect guesses for each bit).
We prove the theorem using the following (equivalent)
setting. We suppose two parties, Alice and Bob, share a
joint pure state |Ω〉AB such that Alice performs a projec-
tive measurement M = {Mx0,x1}x0,x1∈{0,1} on A to de-
termine x0 and x1 and the post-measured state is Bob’s
encoding of x0 and x1. Let pi be the maximum proba-
bility that Bob can learn bit xi, for i ∈ {0, 1}. We note
that without loss of generality, Bob can perform a projec-
tive measurement to guess the value of xi with maximum
probability [31]. Let P = {P0, P1} be Bob’s projective
measurement that allows him to guess x0 with proba-
bility p0 = cos
2(α) ≥ 12 and Q = {Q0, Q1} be Bob’s
projective measurement that allows him to guess x1 with
probability p1 = cos
2(β) ≥ 12 (these measurements are onB only). Consider the following projections (on A⊗ B):
C =
∑
x0,x1
Mx0,x1 ⊗ Px0 and D =
∑
x0,x1
Mx0,x1 ⊗Qx1 .
C (resp. D) is the projection on the subspace where
Bob guesses correctly x0 (resp. x1) after applying P
(resp. Q). Consider the strategy where Bob applies the
two measurements P and Q one after the other to learn
(x0, x1), from which he can calculate x0 ⊕ x1. If both
9guesses are correct or if both guesses are incorrect then
his guess for x0 ⊕ x1 is correct.
Let Bob perform the following projective measurement
to learn both bits:
R = {Rx0,x1 := Qx1Px0Qx1}x0,x1∈{0,1}.
The measurement where Bob guesses both bits correctly
when applying R is
E =
∑
x0,x1
Mx0,x1 ⊗Rx0,x1 = DCD,
with outcome probability 〈Ω|E|Ω〉 = ‖CD|Ω〉‖22. The
measurement where Bob guesses both bits incorrectly
when applying R is
F =
∑
x0,x1
Mx0,x1 ⊗Rx¯0,x¯1 = (I −D)(I − C)(I −D).
The probability of this measurement outcome is
〈Ω|F |Ω〉 = ‖(I − C)(I −D)|Ω〉‖22. With this strategy,
Bob can guess x0 ⊕ x1 with probability
||CD|Ω〉||22 + ||(I − C)(I −D)|Ω〉||22 ≥ cos2(α+ β)
by (1). Note that
c :=
p0 + p1
2
=
cos2(α) + cos2(β)
2
≥ 1
2
and for such values of α, β, we have cos(α+β) ≥ cos2(α)+
cos2(β)− 1. Therefore,
Pr[Bob can learn x0 ⊕ x1] ≥ cos2(α+ β) ≥ (2c− 1)2.
For the second statement, ideally, we would like to ex-
tend our proof approach from bits to strings, but unfor-
tunately this statement is not true anymore if x0 and x1
are strings. Instead, the analysis in [23] can be general-
ized to strings to show
Pr[learning (x0, x1)] ≥
(
cos2(α) + cos2(β)
2
)
cos2(α+β).
If c ≥ 1/2, then by the same reasoning as above, we have
Pr[learning (x0, x1)] ≥ c(2c − 1)2. The statement about
the XOR follows directly from the above statement.
Proofs of the security bounds for oblivious transfer
protocols
We now provide proofs of the lower bounds of 59.9%
and 58.52% for any oblivious transfer and oblivious
string transfer protocol, respectively, with p = 1, by
relating them to bit commitment. A quantum bit
commitment protocol, denoted BC, is an interactive
protocol with no inputs, between Alice and Bob, with
two phases:
• Commit phase: Bob chooses a random b and inter-
acts with Alice to commit to b.
• Reveal phase: Alice and Bob interact to reveal b to
Alice.
• If the parties are honest, Alice accepts the value of
b.
We say that the bit commitment protocol has cheating
probabilities ABC and BBC where
• BBC :=max
 ∑
b∈{0,1}
1
2
Pr[Alice accepts outcome b]
,
• ABC := Pr[Alice can learn b after commit phase].
We present a bit commitment protocol based on
oblivious string transfer [23].
1. Commit phase: Alice and Bob perform the
OTn1 protocol such that Alice gets the output
(z0, z1) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n and Bob gets the output
(b, w) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}n. Here, b is the committed
bit.
2. Reveal phase: If no one aborted, then Bob sends
(b, w) to Alice.
3. If (b, w) from Bob is inconsistent with (z0, z1)
then Alice aborts. Otherwise, she accepts b as the
committed bit.
Let AOTn denote the probability Alice can learn b in
the OTn1 protocol without Bob aborting. Clearly we have
AOTn = ABC.
Let BOTn denote the probability Bob can learn z0 ⊕ z1
in the OTn1 protocol without Alice aborting. Notice that
Bob must send (c, zc) if he wants to reveal c in the BC
protocol. Therefore, by letting q be the probability the
OTnp is not aborted by Alice using Bob’s optimal bit com-
mitment strategy, we have BBC = qc, where
c =
1
2
∑
b∈{0,1}
Pr[Bob learns zb|Alice did not abort OTn1 ].
From Theorem 1, we know that Bob has a strategy to
learn (z0, z1) with probability,
BOTn ≥ qc(2c− 1)2,
noting that BBC ≥ 1/2 =⇒ c ≥ 1/2.
We now use the lower bound for bit commitment [19],
which states that there is a parameter t ∈ [0, 1] such that
BBC ≥
(
1−
(
1− 1√
2
)
t
)2
and ABC ≥ 1
2
+
t
2
.
The above bound yields the lower bound
max{AOTn , BOTn} ≥ 0.5852, which is independent
of n. If n = 1, we can use the stronger bound in
Theorem 1 to get
BOT ≥ q(2c− 1)2,
improving the lower bound to the desired value
max{AOT, BOT} ≥ 0.599.
